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Abstract 
The authors use experiences with interest arbitration for police and firefighters 
under New York State’s Taylor Law from 1974 to 2007 to examine the central debates 
about the effects of this form of arbitration on collective bargaining. They draw on old 
and new data to compare experience with interest arbitration in the first three years after 
it was adopted with experiences from 1995 to 2007. They find that no strikes have 
occurred under arbitration, rates of dependence on arbitration declined considerably, the 
effectiveness of mediation prior to and during arbitration remained high, the tripartite 
arbitration structure continued to foster discussion of options for resolution among 
members of the arbitration panels, and wage increases awarded under arbitration matched 
those negotiated voluntarily by the parties. Econometric estimates of the effects of 
interest arbitration on wage changes in a national sample suggest wage increases between 
1990 and 2000 in states with arbitration did not differ significantly from those in states 
with non-binding mediation and factfinding or states without a collective bargaining 
statute. The length of time required to complete the arbitration process increased 
substantially and several critical employment relations issues facing the parties have not 
been addressed within the arbitration system. The authors suggest these findings should 
be considered by both critics and supporters of proposals to include a role for interest 
arbitration in national labor policy. 
The role of interest arbitration in collective bargaining negotiations has been a 
topic of longstanding debate among industrial relations researchers and policy makers 
and features prominently in contemporary debates over how to reform national labor 
laws. A bill to provide for final offer arbitration to resolve emergency disputes in airline 
was introduced and debated in the Senate in 2001 and at the time of this writing, both 
houses of Congress—and the nation—are debating the merits of the Employee Free 
Choice Act (EFCA).2 EFCA proposes that—for the first time in U.S. history— 
2
 See Airline Labor Dispute Resolution Act, S.1327 available at 
http//www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s107-1327. As noted earlier, more recently the debate 
over the merits of interest arbitration has been heightened by the proposed Employee Free Choice Act. For 
the 2008 version of the Employee Free Choice Act, see “The Employee Free Choice Act” (H.R. 800) 
available at http://thoms.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.800. Support for the bill is summarized at the 
website of the American Rights at Work http://americanrightsatwork.org. Arguments against the bill are 
summarized on the website of the Heritage Foundation 
http;//www.heritage.org/research/labor/wm1768.cfm. 
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arbitration be used to resolve impasses between private employers and newly certified 
unions arising out of the negotiation of their first labor contract. 
While there is very limited experience with mandated interest arbitration in the 
private sector, for several decades, interest arbitration has been used in twenty public 
sector jurisdictions to resolve bargaining impasses between municipalities and their 
police officers and firefighters (Valletta and Freeman, 1988). The passage of these 
arbitration statutes in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a number of studies that 
examined early experiences with arbitration (Loewenberg, 1968; Stern, Rehmus, 
Loewenberg, Kasper, and Dennis, 1975; Lipsky and Drotning, 1977; Thompson and 
Cairne, 1973; Lester, 1984). Since then, however, “There has been a virtual stoppage of 
books and articles on [ the public] sector’s labor relations” (U.S. Secretary of Labor’s 
Task Force Report, 1995: 103). 
In this paper we seek to fill at least a portion of the gap in research on interest 
arbitration by examining experience with the arbitration of police and firefighter disputes. 
We draw on data used to evaluate the effects of the introduction of arbitration in police 
and firefighter negotiations in New York State in 1974 (Kochan, Baderschneider, 
Ehrenberg, Jick, and Mioni, 1978) and update these data to capture experiences under this 
law from 1995 to 2007. We also supplement the New York State data with descriptive 
statistics and econometric analyses from a national data set that allow us to compare the 
effects of interest arbitration with the effects of mediation or factfinding and the absence 
of a bargaining statute on changes in police and firefighter wages over time. In the final 
section we discuss the implications of these results for contemporary debates over the 
role of arbitration in national labor policy. 
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The Longstanding Theoretical Debate: Is Arbitration Compatible with Collective 
Bargaining? 
Because arbitration provides a binding resolution by one or more neutral experts, 
it has been viewed by many as a fair and effective way to resolve disputes when the costs 
of a strike to the public or to the parties are too high to tolerate or when power is so 
imbalanced in a relationship that one of the parties can refuse to negotiate and impose its 
will on the other. Indeed, opinion polls have shown that the majority of the American 
public prefers arbitration to strikes in these types of situations (Bok and Dunlop, 1970; 
Hart Research Associates, 2009). 
Most of the post-World War II generation of industrial relations experts, 
however--many of whom served on the World War II War Labor Board--opposed 
compulsory arbitration (Taylor, 1948; Phelps, 1964). They argued that society should 
instead promote “free collective bargaining,” i.e., bargaining free of intervention or 
control by government or other outside parties (Northrup, 1966). Some experts worried 
that the use of arbitration in contract negotiations would “chill” the negotiations process 
or result in the parties’ having a high and perhaps increasing rate of dependence on 
arbitration in lieu of reaching voluntary agreements (the so-called “narcotic effect”) 
(Wirtz, 1963). The presumed existence of the chilling effect was also premised on the 
view that interest arbitrators almost never sided entirely with one side or the other, but 
issued awards that were somewhere between the two sides’ final positions. If arbitrators 
split the difference between the parties’ final positions, then the parties have a greater 
incentive to hold to exaggerated proposals during negotiations and a reduced incentive to 
make mutual concessions. If these premises are correct, then, over time, the availability 
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of interest arbitration would lead to fewer voluntary agreements and more reliance on 
arbitration. 
Others, including many public sector managers, feared that the availability and 
use of interest arbitration would have a significant effect on wages, salaries, and 
compensation. They believed that using arbitration to resolve public sector disputes 
would drive public sector pay to levels significantly above acceptable norms and would 
result in higher taxes or strains on public budgets (Wellington and Winter, 1971; Stanley, 
1972). 
In 1966 Carl Stevens published a highly influential article that proposed a remedy 
for the presumed narcotic and chilling effects of interest arbitration (Stevens, 1966). 
Stevens introduced the idea of final offer arbitration, a form that would limit an 
arbitrator’s options to the choice of either the employer’s final offer or the union’s 
(thereby eliminating the arbitrator’s option of splitting the difference). Stevens argued 
that the disincentive to compromise in conventional arbitration would be eliminated 
under his proposal. If the arbitrator were forced to choose one party’s final position or 
the other’s, Stevens believed, then during negotiations each side would have a strong 
incentive to offer a position it believed would be most appealing to the arbitrator. An 
attempt by one party to offer such a compromise would lead to the other side offering a 
compromise that it believed would be even more attractive to the arbitrator. Thus, 
Stevens believed that final offer arbitration would lead to a dynamic process of offers and 
counteroffers, resulting in agreements between the parties short of the use of arbitration. 
It was the historic rise of collective bargaining in the public sector in the 1960s 
that cast these longstanding theoretical arguments about arbitration in an entirely new 
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light. Policy makers and scholars alike were faced with a dilemma. They sought means 
of extending collective bargaining to the public sector, but they also wanted to protect the 
public from strikes. On the one hand, few state legislatures or governors were willing to 
grant public employees the right to strike. On the other hand, neither were they ready to 
cede final decision-making authority to arbitrators. Several states in add ition to New 
York created blue-ribbon commissions that included prominent post-war labor relations 
scholars to recommend ways to resolve this dilemma (Lester, 1984). Not surprisingly, 
given the prevailing views discussed above, arbitration was not included in most of the 
initial public sector bargaining statutes enacted during the 1960s. Although most of these 
new statutes prohibited strikes, they chose various combinations of mediation or 
factfinding with recommendations as dispute resolution options rather than binding 
arbitration (Lester, 1984). 
In New York, for example, a blue ribbon committee chaired by former Chairman 
of the War Labor Board, George Taylor, recommended a law that provided for mediation 
and factfinding, but not arbitration. This law, commonly referred to as the Taylor Act, 
was enacted in 1967 (N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§200-214; Lefkowitz, et al., 1998; Donovan, 
1990). Despite the Taylor Law’s prohibition on strikes, however, in the two years 
following its passage in 1967, there were nearly forty public sector strikes in the State 
(Oberer, et al., 1970). In 1969 the Legislature, dissatisfied with the operation of the 
Law’s impasse procedures, added amendments to the act encouraging the parties to use 
voluntary interest arbitration (N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§209.2 and 209.3; Lefkowitz, pp. 
525-526). In 1974 the legislature amended the law to require interest arbitration for 
police officers and firefighters (N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §209.4; Lefkowitz, et al., pp. 766-
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767). The amendment provided for the use of conventional (not final offer) arbitration. 
It was designated as an “experiment” with a three year duration at which point the 
legislature would decide whether to continue it, amend it further, or return to the prior 
procedures. 
Thus, the passage of the 1974 amendment provided the opportunity to test for the 
effects of arbitration on the process and outcomes of bargaining by comparing bargaining 
under mediation/factfinding from 1967 to 1973 with bargaining under arbitration from 
1974 to 1976, the three years designated as the “experimental” period for the new 
procedures. The legislature’s decision in 1976 to continue the law to the present time 
allowed us to update these data and examine the effects of arbitration over this longer 
time period. Specifically, in the analysis to follow we present data to test for the chilling 
and narcotic effects on the negotiation and agreement making processes and then 
supplement these data with descriptive statistics and econometric results from a national 
data set that test for the effects of arbitration on wage outcomes. 
Methods 
Data on the initial experiences with arbitration are drawn from a large-scale study 
that compared experiences under the Taylor Law’s mediation and factfinding procedures 
in effect from 1967 to 1973 with experiences under arbitration from 1974 to 1976. Data 
were collected on the complete set of police and firefighter bargaining units in effect over 
that time period. These data were used to test whether the change from 
mediation/factinding to arbitration led to: (1) greater or fewer settlements without an 
impasse, (2) greater or fewer settlements in mediation, (3) more or fewer strikes or other 
forms of job actions, and (4) higher or lower wage increases. In addition interviews with 
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participants in the arbitration process were carried out to explore how the administration, 
decision-making process, and general experiences under interest arbitration unfolded for 
cases that went through the complete process. Interviews followed a semistructured 
protocol (Kochan et. al., 1978; 206-16). 
To determine how arbitration fared in the thirty years following the initial study 
we address the same basic questions as were addressed in the original study, albeit with 
more limited data and methods. Impasse data were collected from the New York State 
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) from 1995 through 2007.3 These data were 
supplemented by records of arbitration awards and negotiated collective bargaining 
agreements archived at the Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations Catherwood 
Library. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten of the most active neutral 
arbitrators who together accounted for nearly half of the arbitration cases completed 
between 2002 and 2007. They were asked to describe how they conducted their 
arbitration processes using a subset of the same questions used to capture these data from 
arbitrator interviews in the earlier study. That is, they were asked about their experiences 
and satisfaction with the tripartite panels, their willingness and ability to mediate and/or 
narrow differences in the parties’ positions, and to identify any issues that were 
particularly problematic in the arbitration proceedings. They were also asked whether, 
based on their experiences, they preferred to continue the tripartite structure, shift to a 
single arbitrator model, or make any other modifications to the dispute resolution process. 
To better understand how the law is perceived currently by the parties directly involved 
in and responsible for administering it, interviews covering these same questions were 
3
 Unfortunately, PERB did not collect systematic data on impasse histories between 1976 and 1995. Those 
data that were collected in these interim years were subsequently lost to a flood in the New York State 
Archives. 
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conducted with representatives of the New York State police and firefighter unions, the 
municipa l association that represents cities and towns, and officials at the PERB. 
One important piece of information no state agency or private group has collected 
is the number of bargaining units negotiating contracts in a given year. We therefore 
developed a means of estimating this number. A combination of archival records and 
interviews with police and firefighter representatives indicated that there are 
approximately 97 firefighter bargaining units and 326 police bargaining units covered by 
the Law. Since the average contract duration for these bargaining units was 2.8 years, we 
assume that one-third of these units negotiated contracts each year. 
Results 
The Initial Years 
The results from the initial study of the net effects of the change from 
mediation/factfinding interest arbitration on the process and results of bargaining are 
summarized below: 
1. The probability of going to impasse under arbitration increased by 16 percent, but 
so too did the likelihood that the parties would resolve their impasse in mediation. 
The probability of settling in mediation after the arbitration amendments went 
into effect increased by 13 to 18 percent. 
2. Overall there was about a 15 percent increase in the likelihood the parties would 
go to arbitration compared to the probability during the earlier period of going 
beyond factfinding to a legislative hearing. 
3. Dependence on the impasse procedures increased in each successive round of 
negotiation under factfinding and this pattern continued in the first round under 
arbitration, a pattern that reflected the predictions of those worried about a 
potential narcotic effect.4 
4 This pattern is reported in detail in Kochan and Baderschneider (1978). See also Butler and Ehrenberg 
(1981) and Kochan and Baderschneider (1981) for further discussion of whether or not the patterns 
observed were consistent with how earlier scholars defined the narcotic effect. 
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4. There were no significant effects of the change to interest arbitration on wages 
and no differences in the rates of wage increases granted by arbitrators compared 
to those negotiated voluntarily by the parties. 
5. Since no strikes occurred during the three years of experience under the 
arbitration amendments or in the last round of negotiations under factfinding, no 
conclusions could be drawn on the relative effectiveness of interest arbitration 
with respect to avoiding strikes or other work stoppages. 
6. The qualitative analysis of the tripartite interest arbitration process found that both 
management and union representatives were generally satisfied with the 
procedural and administrative aspects of tripartite arbitration, but city 
representatives continued to oppose the arbitration amendments as a matter of 
principle. The tripartite structure had resulted in a good deal of mediation by the 
neutral arbitrator with the party-appointed arbitrators after the hearing had been 
completed but before the award was written. 
More Recent Years: Déjà vu All over Again? 
Our findings pertaining to the impasse resolution processes from 1995 to 2007 
are summarized in Figures 1 through 4. 5 
Avoiding Strikes 
The primary purpose of using arbitration is to avoid work stoppages by essential 
public service employees. On this criterion the arbitration statute has clearly met its 
objectives. No police or firefighter unit engaged in a strike in the traditional sense of a 
complete work stoppage over this thirty-year period. PERB listed twelve incidents 
involving police and firefighter units in its Work Stoppages file since 1976. However, 
most if not all of these appear to be some form of sickout, refusal to work overtime, or 
5
 These results focus only on police and firefighter bargaining units in cities and towns outside of New 
York City. Before 1998, the arbitration of New York City police and firefighter disputes was administered 
by the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining. In 1998 the Legislature transferred jurisdiction 
over police and firefighter bargaining impasses from the OCB to PERB, although OCB retains jurisdiction 
over improper practices and representation matters. New York City contested the constitutionality of this 
transfer, but the New York Court of Appeals rejected the City’s claim in 2001 (Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Association of the City of New York v. City of New York, 2001 NY Int. 149, December 20, 2001, found at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/101_0149.htm, accessed on March 20, 2009). For an analysis of 
arbitration experiences in New York City, see Lipsky and Katz (2006). 
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some other type of limited job action. Eight of these twelve events occurred between 
1977 and 1981 in the City of Yonkers, a period during which the State had set up an 
emergency control board to oversee the city’s finances.6 Three others--the Orangetown 
police in 1995, Buffalo police in 2002, and Kings Point police in 2003—were ultimately 
judged by PERB to fall short of a “strike action.” As a point of comparison, PERB’s 
records indicate that 33 teacher strikes occurred in New York State between 1977 and 
2007.7 
Although the arbitration statute has clearly achieved its objective of preventing 
work stoppages, other factors may have also played a role. One factor has probably been 
the Triborough Doctrine, which requires a public sector employer to continue an expired 
agreement until a new agreement is negotiated or resolved by mediation, factfinding, or 
arbitration. The doctrine, first articulated in a decision by PERB in 1972, was added by 
amendment to the Taylor Law in 1982. 8 A union, however, forfeits its right to preserve 
all the terms of an expired agreement if it goes on strike. 
The fact that strikes by public sector employees are unlawful in New York State 
may prompt those in law enforcement to think twice before they go on strike and violate 
the law. The illegality of strikes under the Taylor Law may be as or more important than 
interest arbitration in deterring work stoppages by police officers and firefighters. 
Impasse and Arbitration Rates 
6
 The emergency control board in Yonkers continues to operate under legislation passed in 1984. See 
http://law.justia.com/newyork/codes/yonkers-financial-emergency-act-103.84/, accessed on March 20, 
2009. 
7
 There were 40 job actions by teachers during this period, but PERB found that only 33 were actually 
8 
strikes as defined by Section 210.1 of the Taylor Law. 
PERB’s 1972 decision was Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB 3037 (1972). The 
Triborough amendment is at 1982 N.Y. Laws chs. 868, 921. 
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The data in Figure 1 provide a test of whether or not a “narcotic” pattern of 
dependence has built up within these bargaining units over time. Between 1995 and 2007 
approximately 28 percent of firefighter units and 40 percent of police negotiations went 
to impasse and only 7 percent of firefighter and 9 percent of police contracts were 
resolved by an arbitration award. These impasse and arbitration rates compare favorably 
to the experience in the early years of the process. The 1976 study found that 57 percent 
of firefighter and 74 percent of police units went to impasse and 26 percent of firefighter 
and 31 percent of police contracts were resolved by an arbitration award. Thus, there is 
no evidence of either a high or an increasing rate of dependence on arbitration. 9 The 
trend has moved in the opposite direction over time. An argument can be made that the 
availability of interest arbitration, rather than leading to a narcotic effect, encourages the 
parties to be more realistic in their negotiations and to settle their impasse without an 
award. 
Reliance on interest arbitration does vary across jurisdictions. Police units have a 
higher rate of usage than do firefighter units, most likely because police are more likely 
to serve as a pattern setter for firefighter units within cities than vice versa.10 Several 
9
 Note that Figures 1-4 report data for the complete population (not a sample) of the relevant cases within 
New York. Treated as a sample, a chi-squared test concludes that impasse rates were significantly different 
(at 1%, two-tailed test) in 1974-1976 than they were in 1995-2007, for both police and firefighters. 
10
 In New York City for many years police and firefighter contracts generally followed a pattern that was 
set by the contract the City negotiated with its largest municipal union, District Council 37 of American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). This practice tended to hold down the 
salaries of police officers and firefighters, and as a consequence the City eventually encountered difficulties 
in recruiting new police officers. See Lipsky and Katz, 2006, p. 270. Business groups and other 
stakeholders began to urge the City to abandon this form of pattern bargaining; see Steven Greenhouse, 
“Panel Urges End to City’s ‘Pattern Bargaining’ with Unions,” New York Times, January 20, 2001, found at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/nyregion/panel-urges-end-to-city-s-pattern-bargaining-with-
unions.html, accessed on March 20, 2009. Both Mayor Guiliani and Mayor Bloomberg resisted the police 
union’s effort to persuade the City to depart from the pattern, but in 2007 police commissioner Raymond 
Kelly broke with Mayor Bloomberg and also called for an end to pattern bargaining in New York City. See 
Steven Greenhouse, “Kelly Resists Tradition, and Mayor, on Police Pay,” New York Times, May 25, 2007, 
found at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/25/nyregion/25police.html, accessed on March 20, 2009. In 
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cities are heavily reliant on arbitration. The City of Buffalo and its firefighter and police 
units have needed arbitration to determine their contracts nearly every time they 
negotiated since 1995. Syracuse and Rochester are also heavy users of arbitration. These 
cities were also heavy users of factfinding and arbitration in the early years of the Taylor 
Law. There does appear to be a relationship between fiscal distress and reliance on 
arbitration. 
The data presented in Figure 2 speak to the question of whether or not arbitration 
has had a “chilling” effect by examining the rates of resolution achieved in mediation 
prior to or in some cases during the arbitration process. The data indicate that mediation 
either prior to the arbitration step or mediation at the arbitration stage continued to 
achieve a high rate of voluntary settlement. Approximately 71 percent of firefighter 
impasses and 78 percent of police impasses were resolved by mediation or other 
voluntary means short of an award. This represents a slight increase from the 70 percent 
of police and firefighter contracts settled in mediation in the first three years of 
bargaining under the arbitration statute. 
Effects on Wages 
There are at least two ways the effects of arbitration on wages have been assessed 
in previous studies. One common approach is to compare negotiated and arbitrated wage 
increases for bargaining units covered by the same statute and process. However, both 
theory (Farber and Katz, 1979) and prior evidence (Kochan et al., 1978) suggest that we 
should not observe any significant differences in negotiated versus arbitrated wages 
unpublished research, Lipsky and Katz found that police set the pattern for firefighters in upstate cities such 
as Buffalo and Rochester, but the strength of that pattern had diminished over time. 
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because arbitrators rely heavily on comparisons with other settlements in fashioning their 
awards.11 So it is not surprising that no significant differences in negotiated and 
arbitrated awards were observed in the early years of the arbitration statute. The data 
reported in Figure 3 indicate the same results were obtained in comparing negotiated and 
arbitrated outcomes for police between 2001 and 2006. Negotiated and arbitrated wage 
increases for police officers in the first through the fourth step of their salary schedules 
were nearly identical. Settlements and awards average between 3.3 and 3.6 percent for 
the various steps on the salary schedules. The same nearly identical pattern of negotiated 
and arbitrated wages was observed for firefighters (see Figure 4). However, these figures 
should be used with caution because of the small number of arbitration cases (5) available 
for this comparison. PERB reported similar data for 1998 and 1999 and again showed 
that negotiated and arbitrated outcomes were essentially equ al. 12 
The same results are reported for police and firefighters in New Jersey, the only 
other state where similar longitudinal data are available. Data in the New Jersey Public 
Employment Relations Commission’s 2008 biennial report on its arbitration process 
11
 Most public sector arbitration statutes require arbitrators to take relevant wage comparisons into account 
in fashioning their awards. The Taylor Law instructs arbitration panels to base their awards on a 
“comparison of the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the 
arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other employees performing 
similar services or requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and with other employees 
generally in public and private employment in comparable communities” (N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 
§209.4.c.v.). 
12
 Negotiated police and fire agreements averaged 3.41 percent in 1998 compared to 3.49 percent for 
arbitrated agreements. In 1999 negotiated agreements averaged 3.49 percent and arbitrated settlements 
averaged 3.8.2 percent. See “Contract Analysis Program: PERB’s Summary of Selected Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 1998-1999.” A report of the New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board, March, 2001. Available at the Martin Catherwood Library, Cornell University or from 
the authors upon request. 
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indicate that negotiated wage increases for police and firefighters between 1993 and 2007 
averaged 3.70 percent per year; arbitrated wage increases averaged 3.63 percent.13 
The second, and in our mind, more appropriate approach is to compare wage 
outcomes in states that have statutes requiring arbitration for police officers and 
firefighters with wage outcomes in states that have collective bargaining statutes but only 
use nonbinding resolution processes. Such tests are complicated, however, by the fact 
that states that have enacted bargaining statutes vary from those that have not in 
systematic ways that may also affect public employee wage levels and changes. Kochan 
found, for example, that states with more liberal political environments and higher per-
capita incomes were more likely than their counterpart states to enact bargaining statutes 
between 1960 and 1970 (Kochan, 1973). These variations in state-level characteristics, 
therefore, need to be taken into account in assessments comparing wage changes that 
occur under different statutory regimes. 
Figure 5 illustrates the importance of considering differences across states that 
existed before collective bargaining statutes were enacted. The figure shows levels and 
changes in the mean real wages (in 2000 dollars) of police officers in each decade from 
1960 (before states began to enact public sector bargaining statutes) to 2000.14 The data 
for 1960 show that prior to the enactment of any bargaining statutes mean wages were 
approximately 9.7 percent higher in states that subsequently enacted arbitration or 
13
 See “Biennial Report of the Public Employment Relations Commission on the Police and Fire Public 
Interest Arbitration Reform Act,” January 2008. Available at 
ww.state.nj.us/perc/IA_Biennial_Report20008.pdf. 
14
 Wages for 1980, 1990, and 2000 were calculated by dividing annual wage and salary income by usual 
hours worked per week and weeks worked last year. Both the 1960 and 1970 Census reported hours and 
weeks for intervals, so the means conditioned on the interval values are imputed. Also, because place of 
work (i.e., the state) is not identified in earlier censuses, only those who worked in their own states could be 
associated with arbitration codes. 
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factfinding than in states that continue to have no collective bargaining statutes. 
Consistent with the general pattern of the effects of collective bargaining on wages found 
by other researchers (see, for example, Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007), this differential 
expanded modestly over this forty-year time period. In 2000 police wages in factfinding 
or arbitration states were approximately 22.1 percent higher than police wages in states 
without bargaining statutes. Note, however, that wages in arbitration states tracked 
almost exactly wages in mediation/factfinding states, suggesting that it is collective 
bargaining per se, not the presence of interest arbitration that accounts for the growth in 
these wage differentials. 
Table 1 provides additional de script ive statistics comparing wage levels adjusted 
for difference in per-capita income (to account for the endogeneity of bargaining laws) 
and wage changes between 1990 and 2000 for police and firefighters in New York, in 
other states with arbitration statutes, in states with mediation/factfinding procedures, and 
in states without bargaining statutes. These data again show that wage changes under 
arbitration in general and under arbitration in New York in particular did not increase at 
rates greater than wages changes in states that use mediation and factfinding or in states 
without bargaining statutes. Specifically, police wages increased by 6.49 percent in New 
York and by 5.90 percent in other states with arbitration statutes compared to 8.82 
percent in states using mediation and factfinding and 5.25 percent in states without a 
bargaining law. Firefighter wages in New York, in real terms, actually declined slightly 
(by 0.65 percent) between 1990 and 2000. In other states with arbitration statutes 
firefighter wages increased by 6.57 percent, compared to an increase of 15.72 percent in 
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states using mediation or factfinding and 8.71 percent in states without bargaining 
statutes. 
The data presented in Figure 5 and Table 1, however, do not control for other 
factors that affect wages and therefore do not provide a precise test of the net effect of 
arbitration on wage increases over time beyond the net effect in states using mediation 
and factfinding or in states without collective bargaining. Given the difficulties of 
assembling the necessary data and the technical complexities involved in trying to control 
for other factors affecting wages, it is not surprising that only a handful of studies have 
been carried out that test for these effects. A study of the effects of arbitration on 
firefighter wages in the 1970s conducted by Olson found small positive effects for 
arbitration (Olson, 1980). Using a time series of municipal and state data, Feuille and 
Delaney concluded that arbitration had a positive but modest effect on the level of police 
salaries (Feuille and Delaney, 1984). However, a study of the effects of arbitration on the 
wages of police officers in New Jersey by Bloom found no significant effects (Bloom, 
1981). 
Ashenfelter and Hyslop conducted the most recent and most comprehensive study 
(in terms of geographic scope) of the effects of arbitration on police wages (Ashenfelter 
and Hyslop, 1999). They analyzed wage growth from 1970 to 1990 and wage levels in 
1990 of police units in the states with arbitration statutes and in states without. They 
found that the average effect of arbitration on both growth and level of wages was 
approximately zero. There was some regional variability in the wage effect: arbitration 
in Midwestern states had a small positive effect on wages, a result that was also 
discovered in the studies reported above. Overall, their evidence suggested that the 
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presence of arbitration did not significantly increase the wages of police beyond the 
wages negotiated under collective bargaining in jurisdictions without arbitration. They 
did not, however, differentiate between those states with mediation and factfinding and 
those without a collective bargaining statute. 
We conducted a set of regressions similar to those in the Ashenfelter and Hyslop 
study in order to update their results and to assess differences in the wage growth of 
police officers and firefighters between 1990 and 2000. We used individual-level data 
for police officers and firefighters contained in the 1990 and 2000 censuses, and we 
extended the Ashenfelter and Hyslop analysis by distinguishing police officers and 
firefighters in states with arbitration statutes from those in states using mediation and 
factfinding and in states without bargaining statutes. Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the analysis for police. Tables 3 and 4 present 
regression results for police officer and firefighter wages in 1990 and 2000, controlling 
for demographic characteristics, education, family status, and whether or not the 
individual was located in a right-to-work state. Wages are adjusted by state per-capita 
income to account both for other factors that may affect the passage of bargaining statutes 
and for factors that affect wages across states that are independent of collective 
bargaining and impasse resolution procedures. Wages are calculated by dividing weekly 
wage income by typical hours worked per week multiplied by weeks worked in the 
previous year. Wages are bottom-coded and top-coded at the 1st and 99th percentiles, 
respectively, and 1990 wages are adjusted for inflation. States without bargaining 
statutes serve as the reference category. 
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The coefficients on the mediation/factfinding and the arbitration dummy 
variables, therefore, provide estimates of the percentage difference in wages associated 
with being in a state with these procedures versus one with no bargaining law. The 
coefficients on mediation/factfinding and arbitration are significant for both police and 
firefighters in 1990 and 2000. These results are consistent with prior studies that estimate 
the effects of unions and collective bargaining on the wages of public sector workers to 
be in the range of 10 to 20 percent (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007). The results should 
be interpreted with caution, however, because the coefficients also capture the effects of 
any omitted variables that may affect wage levels across states. Consequently, the results 
should not be interpreted as precise estimates of the effects of arbitration or 
mediation/factfinding on wage levels. 
Our interest, however, is less in the effects of impasse procedures on wage levels 
than in testing whether the coefficients of the impasse procedures variables change 
between 1990 and 2000. Analysis of changes in the coefficients between 1990 and 2000 
(“differences-in-differences”) allow us to test whether police officers and firefighters in 
states that mandate arbitration at impasse experienced greater (or lesser) wage growth 
than those in states governed by mediation/factfinding or states without bargaining 
statutes, under the assumption that the effects of any omitted variables remained constant. 
The differences in the coefficients on arbitration for 1990 and 2000 in Table 3 
indicate that police officers in states that mandate arbitration experienced a small 
contraction (1.6 percent) in their wages compared to police officers in states without 
bargaining statutes. Those in states that provide mediation and factfinding made small 
gains (2.8 percent) relative to those in states without bargaining statutes. The same 
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patterns are observed in Table 4 for firefighters. Taken together, these descriptive 
statistics and regression results suggest three conclusions: (1) consistent with other 
studies of the effects of unions and collective bargaining in the private and public sector, 
the presence of collective bargaining creates and maintains a positive wage differential 
over time; (2) there is no evidence that the presence of arbitration over a long period of 
time leads to expanding wage differentials or higher wage levels than those negotiated 
under collective bargaining without arbitration; and (3) arbitration under New York’s 
Taylor Law produced results roughly similar to arbitration in other states. 
The Arbitration Process 
The New York statute provides for conventional arbitration with a tripartite panel. 
Each of the parties in an arbitration case selects one member of the panel (a so-called 
“party-appointed” arbitrator), and the two parties jointly select a neutral chair of the panel 
from a list of nine names supplied by PERB (N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §209.4.c.ii). A 
tripartite panel serves to protect the parties from ill-advised decisions by neutral 
arbitrators who lack the benefit of input and advice from representatives of the parties in 
the final stages of the process. However, this is only one of a variety of arbitration 
designs found throughout the country.15 Six states have some form of final-offer 
arbitration rather than conventional arbitration; some states use a single neutral rather 
than a tripartite panel. 
15
 The Taylor Law includes a so-called “local option” section that allows New York municipalities to set up 
their own “mini PERBs” so long as their procedures are substantially equivalent to those in the state law 
(N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §212). In New York City collective bargaining between the City and its unions is 
administered by a tripartite agency called the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB). In arbitration cases 
under OCB’s jurisdiction, the three-person arbitration panel consists entirely of neutrals. The police and 
firefighter unions in New York City came to prefer tripartite panels, and principally for this reason lobbied 
for a transfer of authority over their impasses from OCB to PERB. For a more extended discussion, see 
Lipsky and Katz (2006). 
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Interviews with the sample of the most active neutral arbitrators who have 
handled recent (2002-2007) police and firefighter cases in New York confirms the earlier 
findings of Kochan et al. that use of the tripartite panels encourages nego tiations among 
the arbitrators and mediation by the chair between the two party-appointed arbitrators, 
particularly after the adjournment of the formal arbitration hearings. In virtua lly all 
arbitration cases in New York State, after the formal hearings are concluded, the tripartite 
panel goes into “executive session,” where negotiation and mediation are common 
features of the process. In some cases these negotiations often produce a settlement or a 
unanimous award. In other cases the negotiations serve to narrow the differences 
between the parties on some of the issues but not sufficiently to produce a unanimous 
award. The arbitrators we interviewed also told us that executive sessions sometimes 
resulted in tacit agreements but political factors dictated the need for the neutral chair to 
write an award and for one of the parties to offer a dissent. There was near universal 
preference among the arbitrators for the tripartite design over use of a single neutral 
arbitrator. Only one arbitrator voiced an exception to this view preferring the single 
neutral model in cases that involved a single unresolved issue. 
Time Required 
The one big change in the experience since the formative years of the arbitration 
process is that the time from contract expiration to issuance of an award has greatly 
increased. In 1976 it took an average of 300 days from contract expiration to issuance of 
an arbitration award. That number has more than doubled: police arbitration awards 
during the period 2001-2006 were issued an average of 790 days (median was 743) after 
contract expiration. The comparable figure for firefighter cases was 751 days (median 
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was 700). Since the medians and means are close, long time lags are the norm rather than 
the exception of a few outlier cases. Under the Taylor Law, arbitration panels cannot 
award contracts of greater than two years (unless, as in a growing number of cases, the 
parties consent to a longer contract). This statutory requirement implies that most awards 
during the 2001-2006 period were issued after the contract had already expired. Thus, 
the parties were likely to have already been in negotiations over a successor contract at 
the time of the arbitration award. 
Why has the length of time between the expiration of a contract and the issuance 
of an arbitration award increased so dramatically over the past thirty years? We put this 
question to the arbitrators we interviewed as well as several other participants in the 
arbitration process, including PERB’s Director of Conciliation. Although the individuals 
we interviewed differed in their opinions about this matter, several offered plausible 
explanations for the lengthened delay in the issuance of awards. First, all arbitration 
panels in New York State award retroactive pay increases in cases where the collective 
bargaining agreement has already expired. The longer the delay in the issuance of the 
award, the larger the lump-sum retroactive payment received by the bargaining unit 
members covered by the award. Some of the interviewees believe that many police 
officers and firefighters look forward to receiving large lump-sum payments, rather than 
smaller incremental pay adjustments over two years or more, even though economists 
might consider that preference to be in part a reflection of the union members’ myopia. 
Delay in the issuance of the award also gives the unions some leverage on what can be 
done with the retroactive pay increase. For example, as one of our interviewees noted, 
today police and firefighter unions are often interested in increasing the pay rate used for 
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retirement benefit calculations. The union might see the advantages of using the 
arbitration process to trade off a part of the retroactive pay increase for an increase in the 
base salary used to calculate retirement benefits. On the management side, some of our 
interviewees noted that a municipality would benefit if it could invest money put aside to 
fund an arbitration award at a higher rate of return than the interest rate used by the 
arbitrator to calculate the amount of the retroactive payment. If this is possible, then 
management’s incentive to complete the arbitration process in timely fashion would be 
diminished. 
Second, in New York State the so-called “Triborough Doctrine” makes it an 
improper practice for a public sector employer to change unilaterally the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated or resolved by mediation, 
factfinding, or arbitration, and most of our interviewees believe this provision of the law 
is a principal factor causing the increased delay in the issuance of awards16 The 
Triborough Doctrine distinguishes the Taylor Law from the Taft-Hartley Act as well as 
virtually all other public sector bargaining statutes.17 It guarantees that police officers 
and firefighters will continue to receive their existing salary and benefits no matter how 
long it takes to resolve a bargaining dispute. If the Triborough Doctrine significantly 
contributes to the problem of delay, its effects on the parties’ incentives to expedite or 
delay the impasse procedures, including the arbitration process, probably vary depending 
on budgetary and economic conditions. When the economy is strong and budgets are 
healthy, the union’s incentive is to take advantage of the situation and push the arbitration 
process ahead, hoping for a generous arbitration award before conditions worsen, 
16
 1982 N.Y. Laws chs. 868, 921). 
17
 Under the Taft-Hartley Act an employer who has been bargaining in good faith can unilaterally change 
the terms and conditions of employment when an existing collective bargaining contract has expired. 
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whereas management’s incentive is to prolong the process. When the economy is weak 
and budgets are in distress, the union’s incentive is to delay the process, hoping for better 
times down the road, and management’s incentive is to expedite it. As one of the readers 
of an earlier draft of this paper noted, however, the incentive for a union to delay the 
process during bad economic times might be reduced substantially if management begins 
aggressively to downsize the workforce.18 
The Triborough Doctrine has been in effect since 1972, so it clearly does not offer 
a per se explanation of the increasing delay in the issuance of awards. We believe unions 
and employers operating under the Taylor Law’s jur isdiction at first did not fully reckon 
with the significance of the Triborough Doctrine, and it took a number of rounds of 
bargaining before they appreciated the doctrine’s implications. In earlier rounds of 
bargaining both parties hoped for major victories in arbitration, but experience taught the 
parties that breakthroughs in arbitration rarely if ever occurred. Thus, the parties learned 
over time that arbitration seldom resulted in major gains or losses for either side, no 
matter how long the process lasted. 
Some Broader Concerns 
One of the questions we asked the arbitrators and representatives of the parties 
interviewed for this study was: Are there issues facing municipal governments and their 
employees that are not being effectively addressed in negotiations and arbitration under 
the statute? The two issues most frequently mentioned were health insurance and 
pensions. This is not surprising. Health insurance is the biggest problem facing 
negotiators in both the private sector and the public sector across the nation. It is clear 
that individual bargaining units and cities cannot address the full dimension of our health 
18
 We thank Ronald Ehrenberg for making this point. 
24 
care problem. Health insurance for retirees is an especially vexing issue for employers 
and unions. In PERB v. Village of Lynbrook, 48 N.Y. 2d 398, the New York Court of 
Appeals ruled that retiree health care benefits were not an “impermissible” topic of 
bargaining under the Taylor Law. In effect, the court’s decision made retiree health care 
benefits a nonmandatory topic of bargaining and therefore outside the authority of 
arbitrators to consider. Although arbitrators commonly take the costs of union or 
employer proposals for changing co-pays, deductibles, premium sharing, and the like into 
account in fashioning their awards, they are reluctant to consider more wholesale 
restructuring options, preferring to leave those to the parties to work out on their own. 
Pensions have been subject to substantial change in the private sector over the 
past two decades as companies have replaced defined benefit with defined contribution or 
401(k) plans (for a recent assessment, see Ghilarducci, 2008). In New York State, under 
the Taylor Law pensions are not generally negotiable except in the case of certain 
retirement plan options the Legislature permits the parties to decide (Lefkowitz, et al., pp. 
489-491). Yet states across the country, including New York, face serious underfunded 
pension liabilities that will need to be paid by citizens who, in recent years, have 
witnessed their own pension plans being modified or, in some cases, eliminated. 
Both health insurance and pensions are therefore highly vulnerable po litical issues 
and ones of growing public concern. Other issues such as substance abuse and drug 
testing, recruitment and retention of police officers, changes in technology and related 
staffing issues and other issues that affect the quality and affordability of public sector 
services are arising with increased frequency in public sector settings around the country 
(Brock and Lipsky, 2003). Experience demonstrates in New York and elsewhere that 
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arbitrators are reluctant to break new ground in their awards and would prefer to leave 
innovative approaches to the parties. The conservative nature of arbitration suggests that 
only in rare cases will significant changes be achieved on critical contemporary issues if 
left to arbitrators to handle on a bargaining unit level. Thus, although the conservative 
norm governing arbitrator behavior may address the concern that an arbitrator might 
impose an unworkable outcome on the parties, it may also have the effect of constraining 
the innovative potential of collective bargaining. 
Conclusions and Implications 
By examining the effects of arbitration over a long period of time against the 
theoretical concerns of its early (and contemporary) critics, a picture emerges of both 
how this process works in practice and its value and limitations as a dispute resolution 
alternative. With the exception of the increased time delays, on the conventional criteria 
used for judging a dispute resolution system, the New York State police and firefighter 
arbitration system has performed well over this thirty-year span of time and has not led to 
the results predicted by its post-war or contemporary critics. Strikes have been avoided. 
The initial rather high rate of reliance on arbitration has declined considerably and only a 
small number of bargaining units in cities with particularly complex circumstances have 
experienced a high rate of dependence on arbitration. There is no evidence that, on the 
whole, arbitration has had a chilling effect on negotiations. Neither the presence nor use 
of arbitration has led to an escalation of wages beyond the wage levels negotiated by 
police and firefighters in other states without arbitration. Moreover, by use of tripartite 
panels, the parties have limited the potential risk of getting a “bad” or an “unworkable” 
award by having their representatives participate directly in the arbitration decision-
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making process. Specifying the criteria arbitrators are to apply in specific cases adds 
further discipline to the decision-making process and results. These same features may, 
however, lead arbitrators to follow conservative norms preferring to leave major 
innovations or departures from industry or occupational patterns to the parties to 
negotiate. Although this is one of the reasons the above pattern of results prevail, it also 
suggests that other means for promoting or facilitating innovation may be needed in 
settings where arbitration governs negotiations over an extended period of time. 
Since these results were generated in a public sector setting, it is not clear they 
will generalize in exactly the same way to the private sector settings in which labor 
policy is currently being debated. For example, time delays should not be as much of a 
problem in first contract negotiations where contract bar rules expire one year after a unit 
is certified if no agreement has been reached by that date. Yet these may be the best data 
available for transforming what too often is a largely ideological and data-free debate 
over the likely effects of proposals to provide for first contract arbitration under the 
NLRA or binding arbitration of airline disputes under the RLA. Those who oppose 
providing arbitration in these settings should at least be held responsible for addressing 
the evidence that the standard concerns about arbitration have not materialized in the 
thirty years of experience with interest arbitration reviewed here. Moreover, those in 
favor of providing interest arbitration in private sector settings need to examine the 
experience reported here carefully and build into their proposals the design features that 
have mitigated the standard concerns. Finally, notwithstanding its good performance on 
the standard criteria, it is clear that interest arbitration is not a panacea or a stand-alone 
solut ion to the challenges facing labor and management today. It needs to be treated as 
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one component of a broader set of state-of-the-art negotiations and dispute resolution 
tools available to policy makers and practitioners if collective bargaining is to fulfill its 






Police and Firefighter Wage Changes 1990-2000 
(adjusted real wages in 2000 $) 
POLICE 
1990 2000 % Change 
17.98 18.93 5.25% 
19.93 21.69 8.82% 
19.22 20.35 5.90% 
FIREFIGHTERS 
1990 2000 % Change 
15.79 17.17 8.71% 
17.16 19.85 15.72% 
17.98 19.16 6.57% 
New York 20.23 21.54 6.49% 21.75 21.60 -0.65% 
29 
Table 2 
































































































































Police includes all police and sheriff's patrol officers, det ectives and criminal 
investigators, and first-line supervisors and managers of police and detectives 
between the ages of 18 and 65 earning between the first and ninety-nineth 
percentiles. Includes the 50 states, does not include workers in Washington DC, 
US territories, or expatriots. Wage calculated by dividing earned income by 
typical hours per week and weeks worked in previous year. 
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Table 3 
Regression of Log-Wages (adj. 2000 dollars by state per capita income) against impasse 

























































































































*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4 
Regression of Log-Wages (adj. 2000 dollars by state per capita income) against impasse 
provisions and controls, Firefighters 
Variables 























































































































*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 1 
Impasse and Arbitration Rates 
1974-1976 and 1995-2007 
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Figure 2 
Mediation and Voluntary Settement Rates 
1974-1976 and 1995-2007 
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Figure 3 
Police Negotiated and Arbitrated Salary Increases, 2001-2006 
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Figure 4 
Firefighter Negotiated and Arbitrated Salary Increases, 2001-06 
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Figure 5 
Mean Hourly Wages by Impasse Provision and Census Year 19 
19
 Hourly police wages are estimated by taking wage income in the previous year, divided by weeks worked 
in the previous year times typical hours worked per week. Note that a serious limitation of comparing 1960 
and 1970 data is that these Census years report weeks worked per year and hours worked per week in 
intervals; for the 1960 and 1970 estimates, the mean values from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses for the 
associated intervals are imputed. Wages are bottom coded at the 1st and 99th percentiles within years and 
impasse provision. Because earlier Censuses do not uniquely report place-of-work state, arbitration 
provisions are associated with police state of residence. 
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